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SHARING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR BREAST IMPLANTS:
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS ENGAGED IN HYBRID SALES/
SERVICE COSMETIC PRODUCT TRANSACTIONS
RICHARD L. Cupp, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
C OURTS do not apply strict liability in tort to defective services,
but generally allow strict liability causes of action in cases involv-
ing defective products.' Medical professionals providing cosmetic
medical products, such as breast implants, are engaged in hybrid
transactions involving both the sale of a product and a service. 2 In
most circumstances, courts addressing sales/service hybrid transac-
tions allow causes of action for strict products liability.3 For several
reasons, however, a strong majority of jurisdictions exempt medical
professionals engaged in hybrid transactions from strict products lia-
bility.4
This Article analyzes the policy reasons provided by courts and
commentators for exempting medical professionals from strict prod-
ucts liability, and concludes that the arguments for exemption lose
their persuasiveness when applied to cosmetic products such as breast
implants. Extending strict products liability to medical professionals
providing defective cosmetic products would not conflict with the ra-
tionales used to exempt medical professionals in other types of cases.'
Although courts must struggle with deciding how to define a product
as "cosmetic" in this context, existing case law provides models for
making such a determination. 6 Extending strict products liability to
medical professionals engaged in hybrid transactions has important
*Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A., 1983, Pepper-
dine University; J.D., 1987, University of California, Davis. I am happily indebted to Robert
Cochran and Gregory Ogden for their insightful comments, to Nancy Dragutsky, Peri Hansen,
Edward Hueginin, and David Wright for their excellent research assistance, and to the Pepper-
dine University School of Law for funding my work on this Article with a research grant.
1. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 132-191 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 233-257 and accompanying text.
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consequences. In cases involving breast implants, strict liability for
plastic surgeons may prove to be an injured woman's best hope of
obtaining adequate compensation for the harm caused by a defective
product .7
A. The Increasing Use of Cosmetic Medical Products
Both men and women have used cosmetic products throughout
recorded history.8 Rapidly developing technology, however, has
generated a multitude of new cosmetic products that require the
expertise of a surgeon or other medical professional.' For example,
since the early 1960s, millions of American women have purchased
implants of various types to improve the appearance of their breasts. 0
Consumers also have used surgically implanted devices or substances
to improve the appearance of teeth," skin, 12 calves,' 3 pectoral mus-
7. See infra notes 207-226 and accompanying text.
8. See CoNNIE KROCHMAL, A GUIDE TO NATURAL COSMETICS 1-7 (1973). The use of cos-
metics predates written history. Id. at 1. The early Egyptians placed great importance on hair
decoration, often spending many hours sculpting their hair with oils. Id. at 4.
Primitive people used cosmetics to protect against evil, record brave deeds in battle, mark
spiritual events or crises, identify tribal units, and attract those of the opposite sex. Id. at 1.
Many of these customs continue in remote parts of the world. Id. at 2.
Ancient writings such as the Hebrew Scriptures and the Babylonian Talmud often speak of
cosmetics. Id. at 3. The ancient Hebrews regarded their bodies as gifts from God, and thus
placed great emphasis on sanitation and body cleanliness. Id. The Greeks and Romans also
shared the philosophy that the body was a temple. Id.
Cosmetic surgery has also existed in various crude forms for thousands of years. Id. at 1.
Tattooing began with the ancient Egyptians. Id. The Flathead Indians of North America flat-
tened the heads of their children because they viewed it as aesthetically desirable. Id. In parts of
Africa, a broad lower lip was, and to some still is, considered attractive, so the Ubangi tribe
would broaden the lower lip by inserting a small wooden disc in it. Id.
9. Paula Dranov, VANITY FAIR, May 1987, at 65. Today a plastic surgeon can create more
voluptuous breasts, erase wrinkles and bags around the eyes, reshape and sculpture the nose,
remove fat deposits from many different areas of the body, and lift years off the face. The rapid
growth in technology also allows surgeons to perform these procedures with ever increasing
speed, quality, cost efficiency, and reduced discomfort to the consumer. Id.
10. Approximately two million American women have purchased breast implants since the
1960s. Leslie Berkman, The Silicone Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at El; The Breast
Implant Debacle, CHI. TRm., Jan. 10, 1992, at 22.
11. See Sandra Blakeslee, Data Suggest That Implants May Pose Risk of Later Harm, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1989, at Cl; Permanent Dentures with Bioactive Materials, HIGH TECH. L.J.,
Aug. 1986, at 6; Something to Smile About, HEALTH, Dec. 1985, at 20.
12. See Skin in the Bank, HEALTH, Nov. 1989, at 18 (lab generated skin); Synthetic Skin
Promotes Healing, HIGH TECH. L.J., July 1986, at 7.
13. See Surgically Sculpting Athletic Physiques: Liposuction and Calf and Pectoral Im-
plants, THE PHYSICIAN AND SPORTS MED., Feb. 1992, at 153 [hereinafter Surgically Sculpting
Athletic Physiques]; California Society of Plastic Surgeons Inc. Criticizes FDA 's Handling of
Breast Implant Issue, Feb. 10, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file) [hereinafter Breast Im-
plant Issue].
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cles, 4 and other body parts. 5
Critics charge that many of these implants and other cosmetic
products16 provided by medical professionals to consumers are defec-
tive. As widely heralded in the news media, up to fifty percent of the
approximately two million women in the United States with silicone
breast implants have suffered complications that many attribute to
product defects.' 7 Although given less attention, other potentially de-
fective cosmetic medical products also have caused injury and have
led to products liability litigation." Most of the litigation to date has
centered around strict liability in tort causes of action against the
manufacturers of the products.19
B. The Use of Strict Liability in Tort in Sales/Service Hybrid Cases
Although courts and commentators have provided several rationales
to support applying strict products liability to defective products, 20 the
14. See Surgically Sculpting Athletic Physiques, supra note 13; Breast Implant Issue, supra
note 13.
15. Blakeslee, supra note II (penile implants); Breast Implant Issue, supra note 13 (testicle
and chin implants).
16. See Kenneth Posner, Implantable Medical Devices and Products Liability, 28 MED.
TRALt TECH. Q. 255, 256 (1982) (defective implantable devices were responsible for 731 deaths
and over 10,000 injuries over a six-year period prior to 1975, citing Medical Device Amendments
of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 5545, H.R. 974 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 200
(1975) (statement of Rep. Rooney); Blakeslee, supra note II ("Up to 15 percent of the shunts
used by neurosurgeons each year, 25 percent of the pacemakers, and 40 percent of the breast
implants ultimately fail.").
17. Berkman, supra note 10, at El. Other sources have estimated the number at 40 percent.
See Is the FDA Protecting Patients from the Dangers of Silicone Breast Implants?: Hearing
Before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House of Rep-
resentatives Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) (statement of
Dr. Nir Kossovsky); $4 Million Awarded in Breast-Implant Cancer Case, N.Y. TIMEg, March 24,
1991, § 1, at 35.
18. See David W. Christensen & David R. Parker, Don't Overlook Products in Medical
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1989, at 78; Posner, supra note 16; Marc L. Carmichael, Annotation, Liabil-
ity of Hospital or Medical Practitioner Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, or Breach of
Warranty, for Harm Caused by Drug, Medical Instrument, or Similar Device Used in Treating
Patient, 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1973).
19. Telephone Interview with Fredric Ellis, plaintiffs' breast implant litigator for Gilman,
McLaughlin & Hanahan in Boston, Mass. (May 26, 1993); Telephone Interview with Mario Ho-
rowitz, defense breast implant litigator for Dickson, Carlson & Campillo in L.A., Cal. (May 25,
1993); Telephone Interview with Diana McBride, plaintiffs' breast implant litigator for Schnei-
der, Bayless & Chesley in Cincinnati, Ohio (May 25, 1993); Telephone Interview with Joseph
Price, defense breast implant litigator for Faegre & Benson in Minneapolis, Minn. (May 27,
1993).
20. Strict liability in tort, embodied in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
provides an avenue of recovery for consumers injured by defective products which, at least theo-
retically, does not require prroof that the defendant was at fault. Dana Shelhimer, Sales-Service
876 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:873
"lynch pin" of the doctrine is that strict liability facilitates risk
spreading. 2' Strict liability causes sellers to raise prices to pay for in-
surance against increased liability.22 Consumers thus pay more for
products, but are assured that they will receive compensation if in-
jured by a defective product. 23
Under strict products liability, an injured plaintiff may generally re-
cover against manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and
all other sellers in the "chain of distribution. '"2 This broad net of
liability facilitates the risk spreading goal of strict products liability 2 5
and increases an injured consumer's chance of obtaining compensa-
tion.26
Numerous courts have addressed the problems that arise when a
transaction by a party in the chain of distribution has characteristics
of both a sale and a service.2 7 Because most courts will not apply strict
Hybrid Transactions and the Strict Liability Dilemma, 43 Sw. L.J. 785, 789-90 (1989); John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). Although
strict liability is theoretically free from considerations of fault, negligence principles still pervade
strict products liability to varying extents in different jurisdictions. William C. Powers, Jr., The
Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REv. 777, 778 (1983). The problem of
proving fault arises most often in three areas. First, courts often use negligence standards to
determine if the productive is defective. Second, courts will often use negligence principles when
it becomes necessary to apportion loss among multiple parties. Third, courts sometimes rely on
the negligence concept of foreseeability to determine proximate causation. Id. at 780-81.
Most authorities agree on four primary policy considerations supporting strict liability. Mi-
chael M. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 688; John Riper, Note, Strict Liability in Hy-
brid Cases, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 391, 393 (1980). First, the seller can best absorb the cost and
spread the risk. Second, the seller is in the best position to discover and prevent defects. Third,
the consumer places reliance on the skill, care and reputation of the seller. Fourth, privity re-
quirements of negligence often cause wasteful litigation in product defects cases. Another often
stated rationale for strict liability is that the price of a good should reflect its true cost to society,
including the cost of injuries which it causes. Id. at 393 n.8. See also Michael Goodman, Strict
Liability and the Professional Transaction, 50 INs. CoUNs. J. 201, 204 (1983); John E. Montgo-
mery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tart Liability
for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976).
21. James B. Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 13, 34 (1978).
22. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring); Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations about Allocation of Risks, 64 MicH.
L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel-Strict Liability to
the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960); Sales, supra note 21, at 16; Shelhimer, supra
note 20, at 791; Riper, supra note 20, at 394.
23. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. Sales, supra note 21; Shelhimer, supra note 20, at 791.
24. Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990). See Greenfield,
supra note 20, at 678.
25. Sales, supra note 21.
26. Id.
27. Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972); Mauran v. Mary
Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Suppr. 297 (D. Vt. 1970); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Cal. Ct.
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liability in tort to pure service transactions, 28 "hybrid" transactions
raise an issue as to the appropriate standard of liability-whether
courts should allow strict liability in tort, as in cases involving pure
product sales, or should require plaintiffs to prove negligence, as in
pure service transactions.2 9
Most courts allow plaintiffs to use strict products liability in hybrid
transactions involving nonprofessional sellers/service providers. Per-
haps the best known case demonstrating this approach is Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc.,30 where the plaintiff alleged that a permanent wave
solution that the defendant hairdressing salon's employee applied was
defective and caused damage to the plaintiff's scalp."' The case in-
volved both the sale of a product (the permanent wave solution) and
the providing of a service (applying the solution to the plaintiff's
hair).3 2 The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff's implied
warranty of merchantability33 cause of action to stand, reasoning that
a seller should not escape strict liability simply because it applies a
product in addition to selling it?4 In dicta, the court noted that it
would not apply this standard of strict liability to doctors and dentists
App. 1971); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Magrine v.
Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub. noma. Magrine v. Spector, 250
A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969). The distinction between pure sales transactions and hybrid sales/service
transactions could appear misleading, in that every sale involves at least some element of service.
Those transactions treated by courts as "hybrid" have tended to involve significant services in
addition to the sale.
28. Winans v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983); Raritan Trucking Corp.
v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 1972); Klein v. Council of Chem. Ass'ns.,
587 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See Shelhimer, supra note 20, at 791 n.58 (additional cases
refusing to apply strict liability to service transactions).
29. See generally William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in
Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REv. 415 (1984); Sales, supra note 21; Shelhimer, supra note 20;
John C. Wunsch, The Definition of a Product for Purposes of Section 402A, 50 INS. CouNs. J.
344 (1983); Riper, supra note 20.
30. 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
3 I. Id. at 699.
32. Id. at 701.
33. Although it generally is pleaded as a separate and distinct cause of action, in most
jurisdictions implied warranty of merchantability requires a substantially similar, if not identical,
showing of proof as strict liability under section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts. Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 1970). In fact, many jurisdictions treat the
two as synonymous. See, e.g., Bowler v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 563 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C. 1989);
Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808 (D.C. 1970); Goblirsch v. Western
Land Roller Co., 246 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1976); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 666 (N.J. 1985); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 443-44
(N.J. 1974). See generally Donald J. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Con-
trasts between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV.
692 (1965).
34. Newmark, 258 A.2d at 702, 704-05.
878 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:873
engaged in sales/service hybrid transactions, because the importance
of their services outweighs the policy objectives of strict liability.3"
Most courts apply an "essence of the transaction" test in determin-
ing whether to apply strict liability to hybrid transactions. This test
focuses on the predominating aspect of the transaction.3 6 If the key
aspect of a transaction is the sale of a product, and the attendant serv-
ice provided is merely ancillary, most courts allow a cause of action
for strict liability in tort.3 7 However, if the service aspect predomi-
nates, courts generally do not allow a cause of action for strict liabil-
ity in tort.3"
C. The Exemption From Strict Liability for Professionals Engaged
in Hybrid Transactions
For several reasons, courts are "virtually unanimous" in exempting
medical professionals, and in some cases other professionals,39 en-
gaged in hybrid transactions from strict liability in tort. 4 0 In New-
mark,41 the court was careful to note it would not apply strict
products liability to doctors and dentists. In addition to pointing out
35. Id. at 703.
36. See David Crump & Larry A. Maxwell, Should Health Service Providers Be Strictly
Liable for Product-Related Injuries? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 36 Sw. L.J. 831, 834-36
(1982)(providing a historical and legal analysis of the sale/service distinction as well as a general
discussion of the creation and development of the "essence of the transaction" test). For an
example of the "essence" test as it is applied in the strict products liability context, see Carmi-
chael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 383-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that strict liability would
not be imposed on a doctor for prescribing a drug that caused his patient to suffer embolisms
and thrombophlebitis).
37. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 900-02 (Ill.
1970); Newmark, 258 A.2d at 701.
38. See, e.g., Carmichael, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393; see also Crump & Maxwell, supra note 36,
at 834-36.
39. In addition to doctors, courts also have exempted other professionals engaged in hybrid
transactions from strict liability. See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d
Cir. 1968). La Rossa held that a company employed to design, engineer, and supervise the con-
struction of a chemical plant would not be held to the standard of strict liability when the plain-
tiff's husband died from throat cancer caused by his inhaling chemical dust while working at the
plant. Id. at 942-43. The court reasoned that because there was "no mass production of goods or
a large body of distant consumers whom it would be unfair to require to trace the article ... to
the original manufacturer" and then subsequently prove negligerrce, the goals and policies of
strict liability would not be achieved. Id. See also K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, 489 F.
Supp. 813, 819 (D. Conn. 1980) (architect); Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial
Contracting Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (architects and engineers). See
generally Sales, supra note 21 (examining the policy considerations behind strict liability and
their applicability to both pure service transactions and professional and non-professional hybrid
transactions); Shelhimer, supra note 20, at 799 (analyzing the non-medical, professional exemp-
tion to strict liability).
40. Crump & Maxwell, supra note 36, at 831.
41. 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
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the high utility of medical professionals' services to society, 42 New-
mark stated that the essence of the transaction in medical treatment is
the doctor's services rather than the products involved in rendering
the services.43 Further, a doctor's use of medical products does not
rise to the level of a "sale" as required under strict products liability."4
Another frequently cited case in support of exempting doctors from
strict products liability is Magrine v. Krasnica.45 In Magrine, the plain-
tiff sued her dentist under strict liability in tort when the dentist's de-
fective hypodermic needle broke in her jaw. 46 The court noted the
traditional exemption provided to medical professionals, and ex-
plained that the essence of a transaction involving professional serv-
ices is the service rather than the products used in providing the
service. 47 Further, for purposes of strict products liability, medical
professionals are generally not "merchants" in the business of selling
products." In this case, the dentist did not intend to "sell" his patient
the needle that broke in her jaw; he merely used the product as a nec-
essary incident in providing his professional services.4 9 Finally, the
court agreed with Newmark that policy concerns favoring affordable
health care outweigh concerns favoring strict liability for medical
professionals.5 0
Numerous courts and commentators have echoed these and other
concerns supporting the exemption of medical professionals from
strict products liability. The significant arguments against applying
such liability to medical professionals engaged in hybrid transactions
may be summarized as follows:
(1) The services and products provided by medical professionals are
essential to society, so the risk spreading rationale underlying strict
products liability is not persuasive in this context. Risk spreading
42. Id. (arguing that "the nature of the services, the utility of and the need for them, in-
volving . . . the health and . . . survival of many people, are so important to the general welfare
as to outweigh . any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors . . . of strict liability in
tort").
43. Id. at 702-03.
44. Id.
45. 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 250 A.2d
129 (N.J. 1969).
46. Id. at 540. In Magrine, the plaintiff argued "that 'strict liability' is not confined to
'sales' . . . [and] the basic policy considerations of the doctrine apply to the use of a needle by a
.dentist .... Id. at 541.
47. Id. at 543, 545.
48. Id. at 544-45. For a general discussion concerning the various methods courts have em-
ployed in defining "product" for purposes of strict liability, see Wunsch, supra note 29.
49. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 544-45.
50. Id. at 545-46.
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through strict liability will raise prices for all consumers, making nec-
essary medical services and products inaccessible to the poor.5'
(2) Strict liability could persuade medical professionals to stop pro-
viding some medical products and services. Because the services and
products provided by medical professionals are essential to society,
courts must limit the liability of medical professionals so that they will
continue to provide these services and products. 2
(3) No true "sale" as defined by section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts takes place when medical professionals use defective
products as part of their services. 3
(4) In providing medical services and products, the essence of the
transaction is the professional's service, rather than the products
used. 54 The products are merely incidental to the medical profession-
als' services," in part because medical professionals' services are com-
plex,5 6 require extensive training5 7 and are inherently uncertain in
terms of results.5 8 Consumers focus on doctors' skills, training, and
performance more than on the products they use. 59 Consumers' expec-
tations are thus different with regard to hybrid medical transactions
than they are with other types of sales/service hybrid transactions. 60
(5) Because medical professionals typically have a relatively small
client base, risk spreading through raised prices is less practicable than
it is with other product retailers, who typically have larger client ba-
ses.,"
(6) Unlike most other retailers, medical professionals may
51. See infra notes 135-147 and accompanying text. See also Magrine, 227 A.2d at 545-46;
Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (Wis. 1977) (holding that strict liability should not be
extended to the delivery of medical services on the grounds that such would obfuscate the availa-
bility of important medical treatment); Sales, supra note 21, at 25-26.
52. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1969).
53. See infra notes 148-157 and accompanying text. See also Magrine, 227 A.2d at 544;
Crump & Maxwell, supra note 36 at 836-40 (supporting the proposition that a "sale" does not
occur when a medical professional uses or furnishes a good in conjunction with a service). But
see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hasp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 900-02 (Ill. 1970) (holding that
the blood supplied in a hospital-administered blood transfusion constituted a "sale" for pur-
poses of strict liability).
54. See infra notes 159-166 and accompanying text. See also Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381, 392-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Magrine, 227 A.2d at 543.
55. Carmichael, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93; Magrine, 227 A.2d at 546.
56. Posner, supra note 16, at 268.
57. See Carmichael, 95 Cal Rptr. at 393; Newmark, 258 A.2d at 703.
58. See Posner, supra note 16, at 268.
59. See Carmichael, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
60. See Greenfield, supra note 20, at 689-90.
61. See Riper, supra note 20, at 394-96.
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR BREAST IMPLANTS
be unable to obtain indemnification from manufacturers because
medical professionals often do not know who manufactured the prod-
ucts they use. 61
(7) Many sellers lull consumers into a false sense of security through
advertising. This justification for strict products liability does not ap-
ply to medical professionals, however, because typically they do not
advertise their products or services. 63
Because of these concerns, medical professionals engaged in hybrid
transactions, including medical professionals selling cosmetic medical
products such as breast implants, have largely avoided strict products
liability.
II. INCREASING LITIGATION RELATED To COSMETIC MEDICAL
PRODUCTS
In recent years, the number of lawsuits alleging personal injuries
caused by cosmetic products has risen dramatically. The most signifi-
cant increase involves silicone breast implants. This litigation, how-
ever, has focused mostly on the strict liability and negligence of
manufacturers, 6' with few plaintiffs filing suit against the medical
professionals who provided the allegedly defective products. 65 Further,
those cases including causes of action against medical professionals
have primarily been based on negligence rather than on strict liability
62. See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Magrine v. Krasnica, 227
A.2d 539, 546 (Hudson County Ct. 1967).
63. Robert L. Seibert, Note, Hospital Liability-Seller of a Product or Provider of Serv-
ices-Is Th'is Distinction Necessary? 23 S. TEx. L.J. 397, 411 (1982). Commentators have identi-
fied at least two other policy concerns with applying strict products liability to medical
professionals engaged in hybrid transactions. First, allowing strict products liability against med-
ical professionals would discourage them from using new or experimental medical products. Ar-
thur Leff, Medical Devices and Paramedical Personnel: A Preliminary Context for Emerging
Problems, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 332, 335 (1967); Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 627, 651 (1973). Second, because doctors' professional reputations are damaged by lia-
bility claims, courts should not allow liability where a doctor is not at fault. Posner, supra note
16, at 268.
64. See e.g., Landry v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 92-1139-B, 1992 WL 142512 (E.D. La.
June 17, 1992); Steward v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 92-1105-K, 1992 WL 75195 (D. Kan. Mar.
13, 1992); Woolard v. Heyer-Schulte, 791 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Livshits v. Natural Y
Surgical Specialties, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 2436 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991); Rosburg v. Minnesota,
Mining & Mfg. Corp., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); 3-M Corp.-McGhan Medical
Reports v. Brown, 475 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
65. Ellis Interview, supra note 19 (most breast implant defect lawsuits do not name doctors
as defendants); Horowitz Interview, supra note 19 (most breast implant defect lawsuits do not
name doctors as defendants, and those that do are often trying to avoid diversity jurisdiction
and prevent removal to federal court); McBride Interview, supra note 19 (because of the diver-
sity jurisdiction issue, most lawsuits filed in both federal and state courts do not name doctors as
defendants); Price Interview, supra note 19.
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in tort.6 This section surveys the rise in prominence of cosmetic medi-
cal products and the litigation that has accompanied this rise.
A. The Development of the Cosmetic Medical Products Industry
1. Breast Implants
Attraction to large breasts predates modern times. For example,
statutes of the goddess Diana dating from the Roman Empire depict
her with numerous large breasts.67 Americans have always shared this
perception that large breasts enhance a woman's beauty. 61 Early ef-
forts to enhance the appearance of breasts focused on external pad-
ding. A popular saying among American women in the nineteenth
century was "[wihat God has forgotten can be replaced with cot-
ton." 69
Other modern cultures also favor large breasts. In the early twenti-
eth century, doctors in Germany began experimenting with breast en-
largement by injecting a mixture of paraffin, petroleum jelly and olive
oil in women's chests.70 The injections, although initially achieving the
desired results, led to disastrous health problems and were soon dis-
continued. 71
Injections into women's breasts began again, this time in Japan,
shortly after World War II. Japanese cosmeticians used numerous
substances, including goat's milk, motor oil, bees' wax, shellac, vege-
table oils, and spun glass to make their customers' breasts larger. 72 A
66. In fact, most cases place very little emphasis on the defective nature of the product. See,
e.g., Leggett v. Kumar, 570 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (!11. App. Ct. 1991); McGuire v. Sifers, 681 P.2d
1025, 1028 (Kan. 1984); Sansone v. Londe, 753 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Skripek"
v. Bergamo, 491 A.2d 1336, 1338 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985).
67. See, e.g., Oliver Bernier, A Tale of Two Ducal Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1982, at 19
(eight breasts); Tom Lubbock, The Dilemma Between Stone and Flesh, THE INDEPENDENT, May
13, 1990, at 26 ("multiple" breasts).
68. Linda Grant, Real Life: A Distortion of Physical Reality: We Know How It's Done,
But Why They Ever Do It?, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 12, 1992, at 18. Grant also notes that some
women seeking larger breasts have even turned to a hypnotist who chants to his entranced pa-
tients: "And now, blood is pumping into your breasts from your heart, pumping ... pumping
... pumping . . . and your breasts are swelling larger ... and larger ... and larger ... to the
perfect size." Id.
69. Statement of Norman D. Anderson, Associate Professor of Medicine and Surgery, The
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and former chairman of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's Breast Implant Advisory Panel, when addressing attorneys attending Symposium of Breast
Implant Litigation: Current Medical and Legal Theories (June 1, 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Philip J. Hilts, Strange History of Silicone Held Many Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1992, at Al.
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particular favorite was transformer insulating fluid.73 The insulating
fluid was made of liquid silicone, a plastic used extensively during the
war in synthetic rubber, hydraulic fluid, and other products. 74
By the early 1960s, liquid silicone injections were gaining popularity
in the United States. Las Vegas and Los Angeles were recognized as
the centers of the industry.15 In 1965 Newsweek magazine estimated
that seventy-five doctors in Los Angeles alone were performing the
procedure.76 The most widely publicized recipient of these injections
was a San Francisco striptease artist named Carol Doda, whose bust
was transformed from a 34B to a 44DD. 77
Eventually the medical community discovered that the injections led
to serious medical problems, and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) prohibited their use.78 Although injections continued in Ti-
juana, Mexico, their popularity among American women abated. 79
Nevertheless, a total of approximately 50,000 American women re-
ceived silicone breast injections before their popularity waned. 80
The development of a silicone breast implant in 1962 significantly
contributed to the decline of silicone injections." Dr. Thomas Cronin,
a respected plastic surgeon, created an implant consisting of a rubbery
silicone sack enclosing a softer mass of silicone gel.12 He obtained the
silicone from Dow Corning Corporation, the major manufacturer of
industrial silicone in the United States.83 Eventually, Dow Corning ex-
panded from merely supplying the silicone to manufacturing the im-
plants. 84 Doctors viewed the silicone implant as safer than silicone
73. Is the FDA Protecting Patients from the Dangers of Silicone Breast Implants?: Hear-
ings Before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House of
Representatives Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990) (statement
of Norman D. Anderson) [hereinafter Hearings]; See also Hilts, supra note 72.
74. Hearings, supra note 73; Hilts, supra note 72.
75. Escalation, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1965, at 110.
76. Id.
77. Judy Foreman, Women and Silicone: A History ofRisk', BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1992,
at 1.
78. Hearings, supra note 73; Hilts, supra note 72, at 1.
79. See Alison Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits, AM. LAW., June 1992, at 82 (popularity
of silicone injections declined in the early 1960s with the introduction of silicone implants in the
United States).
80. Hearings, supra note 73; Foreman, supra note 77, at 1; Berkman, supra note 10, at Al.
81. Hilts, supra note 72, at Al.
82. Id.
83. Glenn Kessler et al., The Implant Business.- Controversy Threatens to Be a Legal, Ethi-
cal Nightmare, NEWSDAY, Jan. 19, 1992, at 7; Dow Corning Corporation News Conference Re-
garding Breast Implants, Feb. 10, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
84. See Marlene Cimons, Dow Corning Expected to Stop Making Gel Implants, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1992, at AI; Shari Roan, Time Not on Their Side, Say Women With Implants,
L.A. T mEs, May 18, 1993, at El.
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injections because less liquid silicone was released into the body.,,
Further, because silicone implants do not require an injection, FDA
approval was not initially required.6
Seven other major manufacturers later entered the breast implant
market 8 7 although Dow Corning remained the largest.8  There are
four types of breast implants: silicone gel implants, polyurethane-
coated silicone gel implants, saline-filled implants, and double lumen,
or combination, implants.8 9 Approximately eighty percent of the two
million women who have purchased breast implants have done so for
purely cosmetic reasons;9O the remaining fifteen percent have pur-
chased implants to alleviate disfigurement following mastectomies.9 1
2. Other Cosmetic Medical Products
Although consumers are most familiar with claims of defectiveness
related to breast implants, medical professionals sell numerous other
cosmetic products. Dental professionals sell orthodontic cosmetic
devices 92 to several million Americans each year. 93 In addition to
breasts, silicone implants improve the appearance of calves, men's
pectoral muscles, biceps, and other body parts.9 In an increasingly
controversial procedure, cosmetic surgeons inject collagen under fa-
85. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82 (switch from injections to implants "changed the
consistency of the silicone and encapsulated it in bags that were supposed to prevent the silicone
from migrating to other parts of the body").
86. Boyce Rensberger, Top Scientist for Implant Firm Covered Up Findings on Silicone,
1-oUsr. CrtoN., Jan. 18, 1992, at A9. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
87. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 27, 1992) (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Currnt File) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
88. Id. See also Roan, supra note 84, at El.
89. See Sandra G. Boodman, Four Types of Implants, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992
(Health), at Z13; Hilts, supra note 72, at A1.
90. Warren E. Leary, Breast Implants: A Look at the Record, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 13, 1988,
at D9.
91. Id.
92. For a listing and explanation of the latest cosmetic dental products and technology, see
Mary Garner Ganske, Designer Smiles: New Dental Wizardry Can Make Every Mouth a Star,
HEA TH, Nov. 1989, at 82; Steven Morris, Brushing Up on Cosmetic Dentistry, CHI. Tam., Feb.
19, 1992 (Business), at 1.
93. Approximately 4.5 million Americans currently wear braces. Judith E. Randal, Denial
Braces, at Your Age?, NEwSDAY, Dec. 5, 1989, at 9. See also Nicholas E. Lefferts, What's New
in Dentistry, N.Y. Tiars, Sept. 8, 1985, § 3, at 15 (4.4 million current wearers of braces).
94. See Jill Y. Miller, Men Turn to Pec Implants, CALGARlY HERALD, Feb. 11, 1992, at C4;
Harry Shearer, Man Bites Town: Silicone Peaks and Valleys; Now That the Breast-Implant
Craze Has Sprung a Leak, a Moment of Reflection, L.A. TIras MAO., Feb. 2, 1992, at 6; Gor-
don Slovut, Allergic to Exercise? It Happens, STAR Tam., Mar. 8, 1992, at Cl 8.
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cial skin to remove wrinkles. 95 Any of these products may be defective
in design, manufacture, or in failure to provide an adequate warning
of danger, raising the issue of the appropriate standard of liability in a
hybrid sales/service transaction involving medical professionals.
B. The Increase in Cosmetic Medical Product Litigation
1. Litigation Against Breast Implant Manufacturers
Silicone breast implant litigation gained prominent media coverage
beginning in 1991, and may well be the most significant area of mass
products liability litigation in the United States this decade. 96 Only a
handful of attorneys litigated breast implant cases in late 1991; by
early 1992, though, between 250-300 attorneys were litigating such
cases. 97 By mid-1993, it was estimated that the number of attorneys
was between 500 and 1,000.98 By late 1993 as many as 15,000 lawsuits
were filed alleging defective implants. 99 The FDA received 3,400 com-
plaints of physical problems related to implants by early 1992,100 and
approximately 9,000 women had undergone operations to remove
them. Of the two million women with breast implants, estimates of
potential defectiveness range as high as fifty percent-approximately
one million potential plaintiffs in products liability actions. I0' Despite
95. Collagen Corp. Receives Notice of Allowance on Collagen-Polymer Conjugates Patent
Application, Bus. WIE, July 7, 1992; Bernard ldson, Dry Skin Moisturizing and Emolliency,
CosMETics AND ToLETmis, July 1992, at 69; Jeremiah O'Leary, Father Time Ravages Old
Leatherneck Body, WASH. TItS, June 15, 1992, at BI.
96. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. See also Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
97. Frankel, supra note 79, at 82. Between late 1990 and May 1992, Public Citizen's breast
implant cleringhouse membership grew from four to 179 members. id.
98. Ellis Interview, supra note 19 (rough estimate of 1,000); Price Interview, supra note 19
(rough estimate of "in excess of 500").
99. David R. Olmos, Settlement Talks Falter in Breast Implant Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1993, at D2. See also Ellis Interview, supra note 19 (rough estimate of 10,000 cases nationwide);
Price Interview, supra note 19 (rough estimate of 7,500 to 10,000 cases). By mid-1992, plaintiffs
had filed only an estimated 1,000 lawsuits alleging defective breast implants. See Dow Corning
Sees $45 Million Charge, RErER Bus. REP., June 18, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
Thus, in little over one year, approximately fifteen as many lawsuits were filed. One group of
attorneys estimates that as many as two million women may eventually seek relief from manu-
facturers in court. Justice Department Asked to Probe Dow-Corning, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb.
16, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
100. Carol J. Castaneda & Maria Puente, Breast Implants: Fear, Suits-Terrified Women
Turn to the Courts, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1992, at 3A.
101. Berkman, supra note 10, at El. Some sources estimate the number of potential plain-
tiffs at 40%. See Is the FDA Protecting Patients from the Dangers of Silicone Breast Implants?:
Hearings Before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the
House of Representatives Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990)
(statement of Dr. Nir Kossovsky); $4 Million Awarded in Breast-Implant Cancer Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, § 1, at 35.
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the efforts of Dow Corning Corporation, the largest manufacturer of
silicone implants, to settle its lawsuits, the corporation may face liabil-
ity of up to two billion dollars, 02 and the litigation could potentially
continue another twenty years. 03
The medical problems creating this avalanche of breast implant liti-
gation are varied, but they may be categorized as follows: (1) prob-
lems related to exposure to liquid silicone or polyurethane; t 04 (2)
problems related to hardening of the breasts; ,01 and (3) increased diffi-
culty in detecting cancer due to implants.' °6 Of these, the most liti-
gated area involves injuries resulting from exposure to liquid silicone
or polyurethane.'°7 The FDA reports that approximately six percent of
all silicone breast implants have ruptured. 10 Furthermore, unruptured
silicone implants still expose users to liquid silicone through a process
known as "bleeding."'0 9 At least a small amount of the liquid silicone
in the center of a breast implant "bleeds" through the rubbery exter-
nal shell into the body."10
102. Susan Moffat, Girding for Battle: Dow Corning Prepares for Flood of Lawsuits Over
Breast Implants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1992, at DI. A proposal by Dow Corning and other
defendants to settle about half of the lawsuits 'for $4.75 billion would involve payment of ap-
proximately $1.24 billion by Dow Corning. David R. Olmos, Dow Corning Expecting $1.24
Billion Implant Tab, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at DI.
103. Mike McKee, Bar Split Over Implant Ruling's Impact; Plaintiffs Counsel Say Restric-
tions Won't Affect Current Suits, THE RECORDER, Feb. 21, 1992, at 1.
104. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
105. Lawsuits asserting injuries associated with hardening of the breasts focus on the body's
propensity to respond to the insertion of an implant by creating a hard capsule around it. All
breast implant patients experience some degree of encapsulation around the implants, and in
30% to 5007o percent of all patients the hardening creates a significant problem. Berkman, supra
note 10, at El. The hardening itself often causes severe pain and disfigurement, and steps taken
by physicians to remedy the hardening may lead to further injuries. Judy Foreman, Before You
Opt for a Breast Implant. . . Host of Problems Often. Follows Simple Surgery, BOSTON GLoB',
July 22, 1991 (Science and Technology), at 37.
106. Even if something other than the implants causes breast cancer, the implants may block
or distort mammograms, causing a lump to go undetected at an early stage of cancer when it is
still small. Hilts, supra note 72, at Al. Only a small number of lawsuits against breast implant
manufacturers center on this claim. In one of the few cases asserting this claim, the plaintiff
underwent a surgical procedure during which one of her silicone breast implants ruptured. She
alleged that the silicone and other foreign materials that remained in her body after the proce-
dure made it impossible to use mammography to monitor the breast for future cancer. Livshits
v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 2436 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991).
107. See, e.g., Knapp v. Dow Corning Corp., 941 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1991); Morreale v.
Surgitek, Inc., No. 92-1391, 1992 WL 193489 (E.D. La. July 30, 1992); Woolard v. Heyer-
Schulte, 791 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Livshits, 60 U.S.L.W. at 2436.
108. Panel Rules on Breast Implants, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIG., Apr. 2, 1992, at
233 G2.
109. The term "bleeding" is a widely accepted term of art in the context of breast implants.
See, e.g., Saline Breast Implants-Call for Data, PR NEwSWIRE, Jan. 5, 1993 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Currnt file).
110. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
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The effect of silicone escaping into the body is difficult to prove,"'
but plaintiffs' attorneys assert that it leads to lymphatic disorders,"'
cancer,"' and autoimmune diseases such as lupus and connective tis-
sue disease." 4 Despite substantial causation problems, plaintiffs' at-
torneys won large verdicts in several cases litigated in the early
1990s. t" 5
Most breast implant lawsuits include causes of action based on
strict liability in tort for defective product design and/or failure to
warn. "16 Many include defect claims based on the implied warranty of
merchantability,"1 7 which in a majority of jurisdictions is nearly equiv-
alent to strict liability in tort when applied to design defect and warn-
ing defect claims."' As in Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., many
lawsuits also plead causes of action for fraud and misrepresenta-
tion." 9
Although plaintiffs generally succeed in lawsuits against breast im-
plant manufacturers, at least one manufacturer avoided liability
against a defective warning claim by use of the learned intermediary
defense. The learned intermediary doctrine is applied in failure to
warn cases, usually involving drugs. 20 If the manufacturer is selling a
product to a sophisticated intermediary, such as a physician, the man-
ufacturer may be able to avoid liability by warning the intermediary
111. See Six Major Areas of Litigation Predicted For the 1 990s, INSIDE LITIo., Mar. 1992, at
32 (discussing generally the causation problems associated with proving the harmful effects of
breast implant leakage) [hereinafter Litigation]. See also Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp.
1543, 1549 (M.D. Ala. 1991), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1430 (1 1th Cir.
1993) (medical experts presented conflicting testimony regarding the potential harmful effects of
ruptured silicone implants); Frankel, supra note 79, at 84.
112. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 84. See also Toole, 778 F. Supp. at 1549.
113. The National Cancer Institute has undertaken a study of the risks of cancer, while the
University of Michigan and New York University are researching a possible connection between
implants and autoimmune disease. Dr. Allan Bruckheim, Health Line-Letters, CH. TRIB.,
Mar. 22, 1993, at C7.
114. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
115. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82. See also Dow Corning Sees $45 Million Charge,
REUTER Bus. RaP., June 18, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file); Mike McKee, Plaintiff:
Dow Corning Fraud Enough to Sustain Verdict, Tim REcoaDER, Feb. 4, 1993, at 5.
116. Ellis Interview, supra note 19; Horowitz Interview, supra note 19; McBride Interview,
supra note 19; Price Interview, supra note 19.
117. Ellis Interview, supra note 19; Horowitz Interview, supra note 19; McBride Interview,
supra note 19; Price Interview, supra note 19. See also supra note 33.
118. See, e.g., Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Conn. 1989)
(plaintiff sought $350,000 in damages for defendant's alleged misrepresentation, negligence,
strict tort liability, and failure to warn).
119. McBride Interview, supra note 19; Price Interview, supra note 19; See also, e.g., Des-
marais, 712 F. Supp. at 14.
120. See Lee v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd, 898
F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
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rather than the ultimate consumer.'' In such cases, the injured con-
sumer will have only a cause of action against the doctor who failed to
pass on the warning. In Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,'22 the court
analogized breast implants to prescription drugs and granted the de-
fendant manufacturer's summary judgment motion on a failure to
warn claim. The court based its holding on the manufacturer's written
provision to doctors warning of the possibility that the implants might
leak. 2 3 However, the learned intermediary defense is likely to work
only in cases where the plaintiff obtained her implants fairly recently;
until the late 1980s, many manufacturers did not provide doctors with
detailed warnings. 124
2. Litigation Against Doctors Providing Breast Implants
Lawsuits related to breast implants have largely ignored the physi-
cians who provided the defective products. Those lawsuits that do
name doctors as defendants usually do so to destroy diversity jurisdic-
tion and prevent manufacturers from removing the cases to federal
court.'25 Because most cosmetic surgeons were not fully aware of the
risks now believed to accompany breast implants, plaintiffs' attorneys
have, for the most part, decided that the doctors could not have been
negligent in providing the product or in failing to warn of its dan-
gers. 12 6 Further, strict liability causes of action are seldom pursued
against the doctor who provided the implant because of doctors' ex-
emption from strict products liability.'2 7
When plaintiffs target doctors in lawsuits related to breast implants
or other cosmetic products, the cause of action is often based on neg-
ligence related to the way in which the doctor implanted the device, 28
121. Id. at 95.
122. 721 F. Supp. at 89.
123. Id. at 95.
124. See, e.g., Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 (M.D. Ala. 1991), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1430 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (learned intermediary defense fails
because "[tihe jury could reasonably conclude that the warning provided to physicians by [the
manufacturer] did not properly convey the risks .... ").
125. Ellis Interview, supra note 19; Horowitz Interview, supra note 19; McBride Interview,
supra note 19; Price Interview, supra note 19.
126. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 79, at 82 (discussing a breast implant case in which the
plaintiff's attorney believed that the jury exonerated the doctor because "[t]hey felt the manu-
facturer had not told him enough.").
127. Ellis Interview, supra note 19; Horowitz Interview, supra note 19; McBride Interview,
supra note 19; Price Interview, supra note 19. See also supra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 331 (8th Cir. 1983) (alleging that physician
performed silicone injections negligently); McGuire v. Sifers, 68f P.2d 1025 (Kan. 1984) (alleg-
ing physician negligence in removing breast tissue and adding implants); Davis v. Caldwell, 79
A.D.2d 1088 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (same); Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600 S.W.2d
844, 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (alleging physician negligence in inserting implants).
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or how the doctor failed to diagnose or remedy problems created by
the device.2 9 Nevertheless, in the large majority of injuries related to
breast implants, the product itself is the cause of harm, rather than
the way in which the doctor applied his professional skills to the im-
planting and treatment of the product. 130 Thus, in most lawsuits plain-
tiffs presently may not successfully sue the doctor who sold and
inserted the implant. Indeed, doctors have refused to participate in the
proposed $4.75 billion settlement of many of the breast implant law-
suits, based on their confidence that doctors face minimal liability."'
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY To MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS PROVIDING COSMETIC PRODUCTS
This section considers whether the medical professional exemption
from strict products liability should apply in the context of cosmetic
medical products. As discussed above, courts and commentators have
made numerous policy arguments to justify exempting medical profes-
sionals from strict products liability. Support for the exemption, how-
ever, is not unanimous. 13 2 At least one court has held that a case-by-
case determination-as opposed to a blanket exemption-is required
when deciding whether medical professionals and hospitals should be
subject to strict liability. 3  However, regardless of whether one sup-
ports an exemption from strict liability for medical professionals in
other circumstances, such an exemption is not defensible in the con-
text of cosmetic products. As detailed below, none of the major policy
arguments provided for exempting medical professionals from strict
liability retains its persuasiveness when applied to defective cosmetic
medical products.
129. See, e.g., Toole, 778 F. Supp. at 1546 (alleging that doctor acted negligently when treat-
ing problems related to pain and hardening of silicone implant).
130. The surgical procedure for both silicone and saline implants is relatively simple. Claudia
Feldman, Concerns Over Breast Implants, HOUST. CHRON., Jan. 8, 1992, at 1. Complications
that may arise after the surgery are generally attributed to the effects of materials contained in
the implant. Id. See also Judy Siegel, Ministry Panel to Study Silicone Breast Implants, JERUSA-
LEM POST, Jan. 9, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) (approximately 150,000 U.S. women
undergo this relatively simple surgical procedure each year at a cost of about $5,000).
131. See Mike McKee, Plastic Surgeons Pass on Implant Settlement; They Say $5 Billion
Accord is Manufacturer's Responsibility, THE RECORDER, Nov. 5, 1993, at 1.
132. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial 14osp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 904 (Il. 1970) (holding
hospital strictly liable as supplier of blood infected with hepatitis virus despite the fact that sup-
plying products was merely an incidental function of the hospital); Posner, supra note 16, at 269
(finding theoretical justifications for holding doctors and hospitals liable for defective products);
William R. Russell, Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hy-
brid Transaction, 24 HASTtNos L.J. 111, 132-33 (1980) (policy considerations demand that strict
liability be applied regardless of the professional or commercial nature of a transaction).
133. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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A. Concern Over Higher Prices
Perhaps the most cited justification for exempting medical profes-
sionals from strict products liability is that the higher prices associated
with strict products liability are unacceptable when applied to necessi-
ties. As stated in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., ' 3 4 courts must treat doc-
tors differently from other sellers because doctors provide essential
products rather than an "aesthetic convenience or luxury."'
Several commentators share the Newmark court's concern. One
writer argues that strict liability for doctors is unacceptable because
"unlike products, the availability of which may not be critical to the
public welfare, the availability of affordable medical services under
any criteria is of the utmost public concern.' 3 6 Another writer, at-
tacking the application of strict products liability to hospitals, asserts
that the resulting increase in hospitalization costs "could be devastat-
ing to the national economy.""' This criticism argues that the impact
would be particularly harmful to low-income households, since they
are the least able to absorb increased costs. 3 8
Few proponents of strict products liability would deny that it often
leads to increased prices. However, proponents justify the price in-
crease under a risk spreading rationale. Strict products liability in-
creases sellers' tort exposure, resulting in sellers purchasing additional
insurance to compensate for the added risk. 3 9 Sellers, in turn, raise
prices to fund their additional insurance and liability costs. '4 Thus,
consumers pay more for products, but will likely receive compensa-
tion if the products prove to be defective.' 41 In this manner the risk of
134. 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
135. Id. at 702.
136. Sales, supra note 21, at 25-26.
137. Seibert, supra note 63, at 412.
138. See Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal
Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 27-28 (1983) (rise in insurance rates caused by application of strict
liability will raise the costs of medical treatment beyond the reach of low-income households).
139. See Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availa-
bility/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 285, 308 (1988); Ri-
chard A. Posner, Symposium, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory: Can
Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CALIF. L. Rav. 747, 753 (1985); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 313, 330
(1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 573, 584 (1990).
140. See John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Ap-
proach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REv. 677, 710 (1988); Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's
Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 Am. U. L. REV. 7, 46 (1991);
Viscusi, supra note 139, at 584.
141. See Attanasio, supra note 140, at 710; Berger, supra note 139, at 308; Schwartz, supra
note 139, at 330.
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injuries occurring due to defective products is spread over a large
number of consumers, avoiding too harsh a burden on any individual
consumer. All sellers in the chain of distribution-including retail-
ers-are liable, but retailers and others lower in the chain may obtain
indemnification from those higher in the chain.142
Even courts exempting medical professionals from strict products
liability have acknowledged the societal benefits of strict liability risk
spreading. In Magrine v. Krasnica,'43 the court stated that while the
objective of spreading risks is a "relevant consideration,"' 44 it is "not
nearly enough when laid beside other more basic considerations.' ' '45
Prominent among these "more basic considerations" was concern
over the adverse impact strict liability would have on the price of med-
ical care. '46
Courts and commentators concerned with raising prices on necessi-
ties have painted with too broad a brush for the realities of modern
medical practice. Increasing the costs of breast implants and other
cosmetic products would not deprive poorer consumers of essential
medical care. Indeed, in light of the dangers associated with breast
implants and other cosmetic medical products, increased prices may
benefit society. If the products are more expensive, fewer consumers
will purchase them and fewer consumers will suffer if the products
prove to be defective. Further, if one accepts the view that society's
current allocation of resources on beauty (and the pressure women
feel to focus on their external appearance) is unhealthy, then allowing
higher prices to discourage consumers from purchasing expensive cos-
metic products such as breast implants might be beneficial. Consumer
autonomy would not be impaired; if consumers desire to purchase the
products they may do so, but perhaps at a higher price.
B. The Risk That Physicians May Stop Selling Cosmetic Medical
Products If Strict Liability Applies
A second rationale supporting the medical professional exemption
from strict products liability also relates to the "necessary" nature of
medical products. The argument is that society must limit the liability
of medical professionals so that they will continue to provide the med-
ical products necessary to society.' 47
142. Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 545 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 546.
146. Id. at 545-46.
147. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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No evidence exists that significant numbers of medical professionals
would stop providing cosmetic products if they were suddenly saddled
with strict products liability. 148 Even if they did stop selling cosmetics,
the result would not necessarily detriment society. If the product de-
fects lead to a high rate of injuries, as breast implants do, and the
product provides purely superficial benefits such as enhanced physical
attractiveness, then society may benefit from the deterrent effect of
strict liability.
Further, the cost of therapeutic medicine may decrease if imposing
strict products liability discourages medical specialists from practicing
cosmetic medicine. In the event some medical professionals leave the
practice of cosmetic medicine because of high liability costs, they will
not likely turn to selling shoes. Rather, most will focus their practices
on therapeutic medicine, where strict liability in tort is not-and
should not-be applicable. If more medical professionals are practic-
ing therapeutic medicine, competitive economic pressures would tend
to force the price of such services down. Although the lowered prices
may be only marginal, they provide another basis for removing cos-
metic medical professionals' exemption from strict products liability.
C. Is There a Sale, and What is the Essence of the Transaction?
Two of the rationales for exempting medical professionals from
strict products liability are closely related. They are (1) a medical pro-
fessional may not be deemed a seller or merchant involved in a "sale"
as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, or the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and (2) even in those cases involv-
ing a "sale," the essence of the transaction is usually the service pro-
vided rather than the product sold. 49
Numerous courts have addressed cases in which plaintiffs pleaded a
strict products liability cause of action against a medical professional
who was not engaged in a true sale of a product. One example is Sil-
verhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 50 where a physician on staff at the
defendant hospital, while inserting sutures in the plaintiff's vagina,
broke a surgical needle that become imbedded in her vagina. 5 ' The
plaintiff alleged that the needle was a defective product, and pleaded a
cause of action for strict liability in tort against the hospital.12 She
argued that as a "supplier" of the needle, the hospital should be sub-
148. See Greenfield, supra note 20, at 687.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
150. 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
151. Id. at 189.
152. Id.
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ject to the same standard of liability as any other supplier of prod-
ucts. "
The court rejected the plaintiff's strict liability cause of action, pri-
marily on the ground that the hospital was not a "seller" of needles as
defined in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.,14
Rather, the hospital was merely a user of the needle in the process of
providing professional medical services.' 5 Numerous other cases also
have declined to find a sale in similar circumstances. 156
Silverhart and cases like it are properly adjudicated. Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a "seller" as "any per-
son engaged in the business of selling products for use or consump-
tion.' ' 5 7 The UCC, which sets forth the strict liability standard for
violating an implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of a prod-
uct, defines a sale as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price."'' 8 The use of a surgical needle in Silverhart did not in-
volve either a sale or a seller under these definitions. The doctor using
the needle did not intend for the plaintiff to take title to the needle.
The hospital did not set a price for the purchase of the needle, nor did
it expect the plaintiff to retain possession of the needle. Rather, the
needle was merely a tool the doctor used in performing a medical serv-
ice. Although the hospital and its doctor may be liable if the doctor
was negligent in the way he used this tool, neither party should be
subject to strict products liability under these circumstances.
In other cases involving medical professionals and assertions of
strict products liability, a sale may take place along with the provision
of a service, but the service predominates over the sale under the "es-
sence of the transaction"'519 test. The California Supreme Court pro-
vided a controversial illustration of this scenario in Murphy v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc.t6 In Murphy, the plaintiff asserted a design de-
153. Id. at 190.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 190-91.
156. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Magrine v.
Spector, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), affl'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969)
(doctor not strictly liable when he "merely purchased and used" a defective product); Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 796 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that providing blood for trans-
fusions is a service rather than a sale); Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916, 920 (W.
Va. 1975).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1993).
158. U.C.C. § 2-106 (1977).
159. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
160. 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985). Murphy was a 4-to-3 decision in which five out of seven
justices felt compelled to write their own opinions. Id.; See also Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa
Loquitur to Diethylstilbestrol: The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591,
617-19 (1990) (noting that the Murphy decision has led some commentators to argue that the
substantial share requirement is unnecessary).
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fect in the drug stilbestrol.'6 ' The plaintiff sued both a manufacturer
of the drug and the pharmacy where the drug was purchased under
strict liability in tort. 62 Over a vigorous dissent, a four to three major-
ity of the court ruled that a pharmacist is not subject to strict liability
in claims related to prescription drugs.
Murphy's facts are markedly different from those in Silverhart. In
Murphy, the court conceded that "it cannot be disputed that a sale in
fact occurs.' ' 63 Unlike the hospital in Silverhart that merely used a
defective needle, the defendant pharmacy in Murphy was unquestion-
ably engaged in the business of selling the product at issue.
The majority purported to apply an essence of the transaction test
as part of its justification for relieving the pharmacy of strict liability.
The court noted that pharmacists are highly educated, that they often
consult with customers about the u~e of prescription drugs, and that
these considerations characterize the selling of drugs as a service.' 
While the court ostensibly held the service element to be the essence of
the transaction, 65 the court's conclusion appeared to be heavily influ-
enced by concern about keeping prescription drugs inexpensive. I6
161. 710 P.2d at 249.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 251.
164. Id.
165. Id. (dismissing plaintiff's comparison between a pharmacist and an ordinary sales
clerk).
166. In arriving at this dubious holding, the court failed meaningfully to analyze why the
service should be considered the essence of the transaction. Rather, the court focused on the
importance to society of the prescription drugs that pharmacists provide. Id. The court's only
discussion of the importance of the service element of the transaction was to note that a Califor-
nia statute defined the practice of pharmacy as a "health service." Id. at 251-52. In a logic-
stretching exercise, the court analogized this law to another California statute that designated
sales of blood products as services in order to protect blood suppliers from strict products liabil-
ity. Id. at 252.
The Murphy court stated that, because the legislature used the word "service" in describing
the practice of pharmacy, and because in another statute it had designated a medical product a
service in order to avoid strict products liability, the legislature must also have intended that the
practice of pharmacy be exempted from strict products liability. Id. The dissenters vigorously
disputed that the service element of a pharmacist's sale of drugs outweighs the sale element of
the transaction. Id. at 263-64 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Leading the dissenters, Chief Justice Bird
criticized the majority's interpretation of the state Health and Safety Code. Id. at 264-65. She
believed that the state legislature never intended to exempt pharmacists from strict liability:
"[The majority] engage[s] in the purest form of speculation, attempting to divine the motivation
which underlay this supposed intent." Id. at 265. The dissent, however, recognized that the
majority's opinion actually bypassed the essence of the transaction test due to the importance of
prescription drugs to society and the perceived harm to society that strict liability would cause in
this context. Id. at 261-62.
Following a "bombarding" of lobbying efforts nationwide, most states have enacted statutes
similar to the one discussed in Murphy, characterizing blood transfusions as a service rather tharr
a sale. See Marden Dixon, DRUG PRODUCT LLAB. §§ 9.08[4], 9-120 (1981). These statutes appear
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In most cases involving sales of cosmetic products by medical
professionals, the essence of the transaction is the sale of the prod-
ucts, and, unlike in Murphy, no policy concerns require overriding the
essence of the transaction test to avoid applying strict products liabil-
ity.167 In cosmetic medical products cases, the parties generally intend
for the patient to retain physical possession of the product.' 8 Medical
professionals often include a specific charge for the cost of the prod-
uct in their bills. 61 Both parties intend for the consumer to take title
to the product. No doctor would argue, for example, that the silicone
breast implants inserted in a patient continue to belong to the doctor
after the patient leaves the operating room. This alone significantly
distinguishes cases involving cosmetic medical products from cases
such as Silverhart, where the defective needle at issue was not "for
sale" and was truly incidental to providing a service.
Further, a consumer's expectations and approach to the transaction
are likely different in cases involving medical cosmetics than in cases
involving therapeutic medical products and services. The essence of
the transaction, at least from the consumer's perspective, is much
more focused on the product in transactions involving cosmetics than
in transactions involving therapeutic treatment. Again, transactions
involving breast implants are illustrative. In such transactions, con-
sumers may place more emphasis on choosing the size, type, and ap-
pearance of the implant than on choosing the doctor to perform the
relatively simple procedure of inserting the implant. 70
to be motivated by a policy concern of protecting the vital supply of blood rather than by a
belief that such transactions do not entail the usual characteristics of a sale. They were enacted
in response to a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hospital, 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970), which recognized that in cases involving the sale of defec-
tive blood products, the essence of the transaction is the sale of blood rather than the service of
injecting it into the body.
167. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
168. The use of most cosmetic medical products necessitates the direct implantation of a
device into the patient's body. Common examples are breast, pectoral, penile, and chin im-
plants. Therefore, the patient leaves the hospital or doctor's office in possession of the medical
product.
169. According to Dr. Uwe Reinhardt, a health economist at Princeton University, "[tihe
American hospital bill is a source of great humor in the world health economics community;
people just laugh." Elisabeth Rosenthal, Confusion and Error are Rife in Hospital Billing Prac-
tices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at C16. Struggling to increase revenues, hospitals are itemizing
each service rendered, such as aspirin after surgery and even extra pillows. Id.
170. Breast implants are available in a range of sizes and shapes to suit the personal needs of
an indivfdual. Saline implants are made with a silicone rubber shell inflated to the desired size
with sterile saline solution. Saline Breast Implants - Call for Data, PR NEwswaME, Jan. 5,
1993, (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file). The great majority of women seek implants purely for
cosmetic reasons, and most seem to have an ideal breast size in mind. See, e.g., Healthworks:
The Controversy of Breast Implants is Reviewed (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1992)
(Andrew Holtz & Dan Rutz) (transcript #145) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
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When a person is ill, his or her objective in visiting a doctor is to get
well. The patient's focus is on whatever service the doctor might per-
form to obtain that result. Even when the doctor uses a product in
obtaining the result, such as in prescribing a drug, the patient's focus
is on the doctor's skill and expertise in diagnosing the problem and
choosing the appropriate drug. In contrast, when a consumer visits a
doctor to purchase a cosmetic product such as a breast implant, the
doctor's services in implanting the product may be, in the consumer's
mind, ancillary to obtaining the product. The consumer focuses more
on the product's characteristics than she would if the product were
merely a tool used by the doctor to help her "get well."
Finally, cosmetic medical transactions are not as fraught with un-
certainty as are many therapeutic medical transactions. This uncer-
tainty is one of the rationales for finding a doctor's services to be the
essence of a typical medical sales transaction.1 7' A patient seeking
breast implants may know precisely the product she wants and the
cosmetic appearance she desires, and there is little uncertainty regard-
ing whether the product will produce the desired cosmetic result.
Breast prostheses surgery is a simple and relatively inexpensive proce-
dure. It is not the essence of the transaction. 7 2
D. The Size of Cosmetic Medical Professionals' Client Bases
Courts and commentators have argued that because medical profes-
sionals generally have smaller client bases than do other retailers, the
risk spreading function of strict products liability is less effective with
them than with other retailers. 73 This argument, however, should not
be an issue when dealing with cosmetic medicine, as the client base of
a medical professional engaged in the sales of cosmetic products may
be substantially larger than that of a medical professional providing
therapeutic services and products.1 7 4 Many physicians engaged in pro-
viding cosmetic medical products specialize in that field.17 Also, since
other areas of medical practice typically do not even involve sales of
171. See Greenfield, supra note 20, at 698; Posner, supra note 16, at 268.
172. Greenfield, supra note 20, at 698.
173. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., L. Erik Bratt, Implant Moratorium Reduces Time in OR for Plastic Surgeons,
SAN DIEGo UmoN -TRIa., Mar. 21, 1992, at Cl (discussing one plastic surgeon who continues to
perform about 200 silicone and saline breast implant surgeries a year even after the Food and
Drug Administration enacted regulations severely limiting the availability of implants).
175. The growing number of cosmetic medical specialists may be attributed to several fac-
tors: "[T]here is seldom review by insurance companies .... the practice can be highly lucrative,
and ... any doctor with a medical school degree can hang a shingle as a cosmetic surgeon."
Elizabeth Fernandez, Holding Off the Years, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1992, at C7.
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prodtrcts, cosmetic medical specialists are likely to sell more products
than other medical professionals. Additionally, providing cosmetic
medical products may be faster and simpler than providing therapeu-
tic medical services. Surgeons specializing in breast implants have per-
formed hundreds of such operations in a year' 71-arguably as many
transactions as engaged in by many automobile dealerships or other
"big ticket" product retailers who are subject to strict products liabil-
ity.
By purchasing insurance, medical professionals should still be able
to spread the risks inherent in their products.7 Regardless of whether
cosmetic medical providers can spread risks as effectively as typical
retailers, they can unquestionably spread them better than consum-
ers.' 78 Thus, concern over the number of sales transactions engaged in
by cosmetic medical professionals should not prevent courts from
holding them to strict products liability.
E. Knowledge of the Manufacturer's Identity for Purposes of
Obtaining Indemnification
At least one court has argued that medical professionals should not
be subjected to strict liability in hybrid transactions since they often
do not know who manufactured the defective products at issue and
thus are in no better position than the consumer to ensure the quality
of the product.'79 Because medical professionals often do not know
the identities of the manufacturers of products they use, indemnifica-
tion may be unattainable and medical professionals may be unfairly
burdened.' a0 This concern is in most respects irrelevant in the context
of cosmetic medical transactions. Unlike a dentist, who understanda-
bly would not know who manufactured a generic needle she uses,'"' a
medical professional selling cosmetic products should generally know
the manufacturer's identity. When the product itself is the focus, or a
major focus, of the transaction, as in the sale of cosmetic medical
products, greater attention is likely placed on differentiating between
176. Bratt, supra note 174, at Cl.
177. See Magrine, 241 A.2d at 643 (Botter, J.S.C., dissenting) (possible increase in costs to
professionals due to application of strict liability would be offset by insurance); Marc A. Frank-
lin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 474 (1972);
Russell, supra note 132, at 130.
178. Greenfield, supra note 20, at 691-92.
179. Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nor. Magrine
v. Spector, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969).
180. Id. at 546.
181. See, e.g., Magrine, 241 A.2d at 638 (holding that a dentist is not strictly liable for a
needle broken during treatment because he merely purchased and used the defective needle).
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manufacturers' products in selecting items the seller or consumer per-
ceives to be superior.
The market for breast implants illustrates this point. Only eight
companies have manufactured breast implants,"s2 and approximately
thirty percent of the implants have come from a single manufac-
turer-Dow Corning Corporation." 3 Although implant types differ,1 4
it is not unreasonable to expect a physician conducting a breast im-
plant to know which of the eight companies manufactured the prod-
uct he bought.'85 Between the medical professional and the consumer,
the medical professional should bear the burden of identifying the re-
sponsible manufacturer, since the doctor is in a better position to
know who manufactured the product.186
F. Cosmetic Medical Professionals and Advertisements
A traditional policy rationale supporting strict liability in tort in-
volves the consideration that manufacturers and retailers often adver-
tise heavily for products, and that this advertising lowers a consumer's
guard. According to this theory, advertising creates familiarity with
182. All Things Considered, supra note 87.
183. Approximately two million women have purchased breast implants, and about 600,000
of these were manufactured by Dow Corning Corp. Castaneda & Puente, supra note 100. While
Dow Corning Corp. is the largest supplier of silicone implants, the company claims that the
business accounts for only one percent of its revenues. Dow Corning Muls Dropping Implant
Line: Silicone Breast Implants, CHEM. MARKETING RPTR., Jan. 27, 1992, at 5.
184. Over the past two decades, four common varieties of implants have been used for breast
augmentation. The first are silicone gel implants, which most closely resemble and feel like nor-
mal breasts but which are now banned by the FDA. The second are saline implants, which have
silicone shells filled with sterile salt water that may be absorbed by the body in case of a leak.
The third type are double lumen (combination) implants, which are two bags suspended in one
another. One is filled with saline, the other with silicone gel. The fourth type are polyurethane
implants, which are silicone implants coated with polyurethane foam. The foam poses a risk of
infection and release of chemicals that can cause cancer in laboratory animals. Sandra G. Bood-
man, Four Types of Implants, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1992, at Z13.
185. The case of Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd, 898
F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990), illustrates the potential harm to a consumer when a doctor does not
keep records of which manufacturer's products are implanted in his patients. The plaintiff in Lee
asserted injury when her breast implants ruptured. The doctor who conducted the implant proce-
dure testified that he was not sure which manufacturer's implants he used on the plaintiff. Id. at
91. Because the plaintiff was not able to prove the manufacturer's identity, defendant Baxter
Healthcare Corp. was able to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 92. This case
also provides another argument for extending strict liability to medical professionals providing
cosmetic products. Had strict liability been available against the doctor, the plaintiff might not
have had cause for concern regarding the doctor's failure to record the identity of the manufac-
turer.
186. Magrine, 241 A.2d at 642 (Botter, J.S.C., dissenting).
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and acceptance of products, and diminishes the caution with which a
consumer might approach a new and unfamiliar product.
87
At least one commentator has argued that most medical profession-
als' aversion to advertising provides another basis for exempting them
from strict products liability.188 However, even if most medical profes-
sionals shun advertising, this is often not the case for those engaged in
transactions involving cosmetic medical products. While advertise-
ments for heart surgery and anesthesiology services remain rare, pro-
motions by breast implant specialists and other cosmetic medical
specialists have blossomed. In many magazines and newspapers,
"there are pages and pages of glossy ads for cosmetic surgery." 189
After the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1979 that states
could not ban doctors from advertising, plastic surgeons were among
the first to publicly market their products and services.19g In this re-
gard, many medical professionals specializing in cosmetic products
and procedures appear to be more entrepreneurial than their col-
leagues in therapeutic medicine. Consequently, the argument that doc-
tors should be treated differently from other retailers because they do
not advertise loses its punch when directed toward those engaged in
cosmetic product transactions.191
187. Leon Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
TEX. L. REv. 1185, 1190 (1976); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV.
1109, 1371-88 (1974).
188. Seibert, supra note 63, at 411.
189. Laura Fraser, Scar Wars, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 20, 1990, at 72.
190. Paula Dranov, VANITY FAIR, May 1987, at 68.
191. Commentators have noted at least two additional concerns with subjecting doctors en-
gaged in hybrid transactions to strict liability. First, imposing strict products liability on medical
professionals might deter them from developing new medical devices and medicines. Arthur A.
Leff, Medical Devices and Paramedical Personnel: A Preliminary Context for Emerging Prob-
lems, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 332, 359 (1967); Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 627, 651 (1973). This proposition, however, may be doubtful. See Greenfield, supra note
20, at 687. In any case, it is not persuasive in the context of cosmetic medical products. An
argument can be made that discouraging the further development of cosmetic medical products
would further rather than harm societal interests. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, since cosmetic medical products have no greater utility to society than most
other types of products, there is no basis for singling them out with the concern that allowing
strict products liability might impair future development.
The second concern is that imposing strict products liability on medical professionals might
unduly injure the reputations of those found liable, even though there may be no finding of
fault. As stated by one commentator, "Any suit in a court of law against a doctor has a damag-
ing effect on his reputation .... Since the nature of the doctor-patient relationship requires that
a patient have confidence in his doctor, any damage to a doctor's reputation may cause irrepara-
ble harm to his practice." William R. Hadley, Strict Liability-The Medical Malpractice Citadel
Still Stands--foven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N. W. 2d 379 (1977), 11 CREIOHTON L. REV.
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IV. SOME LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF EXTENDING STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS ENGAGED IN SALES OF COSMETIC
PRODUCTS
Presently negligence is the only cause of action an injured consumer
normally may bring against medical professionals selling defective
cosmetic products. This section analyzes utilizing a negligence theory
against medical professionals providing defective cosmetic products,
and concludes that in many cases this theory fails to provide an ade-
quate remedy. This section also considers the likelihood that many
manufacturers of cosmetic products-the traditional deep pockets in
defective cosmetic medical product cases-may become judgment-
proof (at least in breast implant cases). Thus, this Article's position
that courts should apply strict products liability to medical profession-
als selling defective cosmetic products likely will be of practical signif-
icance in cosmetic product litigation.
A. Utilizing Negligence Causes of Action Against Medical
Professionals Providing Defective Cosmetic Products
Injured consumers face significant challenges in establishing that
medical professionals were negligent in providing cosmetic medical
products. For example, in order to prove negligent failure to warn of
a dangerous product, the injured plaintiff must prove that the medical
professional knew or should have known of the risk she failed ade-
quately to warn against. 92 Providing such proof against a retailer is
more difficult than against a manufacturer since, among other things,
the manufacturer has control over the development and production of
the product. Often retailers are not negligent in failing to warn of
dangers for which the manufacturer should have provided a warning.
Even if a medical professional does know or should know of a prod-
uct's danger, an injured consumer may be hard pressed to prove when
the professional obtained or should have obtained that knowledge. 193
1357, 1379 (1978). See also Posner, supra note 16, at 268.
This argument, made in 1970s, is of less concern today, when malpractice lawsuits are wide-
spread and the public arguably understands that nearly every doctor will be named in a malprac-
tice lawsuit at least once in her career. Also, concerns about the damage to reputation caused to
other sellers have not prevented courts from subjecting them to strict liability; sellers of cosmetic
services and products are not sufficiently unique to merit special protection for their reputations.
192. See Warrington v. Pfizer & Co., 80 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding
manufacturer, not doctor, liable where doctor reasonably relied on manufacturer's assurance of
product safety).
193. The difficult burden upon plaintiffs to prove a manufacturer's knowledge in products
liability cases led to the development of the imputed knowledge theory. By imputing knowledge
to the manufacturer, the plaintiff is "under no obligation to show that the defendant negligently
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Unless the plaintiff can prove that the doctor learned or should have
learned of the danger prior to the doctor's sale to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff likely cannot prevail. Further, even in cases in which the
medical professional was negligent, obtaining proof of his level of
knowledge about risks may involve substantial difficulty and ex-
pense.194
These concerns have already manifested themselves in the relatively
few breast implant cases in which plaintiffs have pursued medical
professionals as defendants. In Toole v. McClintock,'95 the jury
awarded an Alabama woman $5.4 million against the manufacturer of
her defective breast implants but declined to find any liability on the
part of the doctor.196 The plaintiff's attorney believed that the jury
exonerated the doctor because "they felt the manufacturer had not
told him enough." 97
One way to solve these proof problems is by imputing knowledge of
risk to sellers and thus distinguishing strict liability from negligence. 98
In contrast to a negligence action, a court applying the imputed
knowledge approach to warnings claims would not require the plain-
tiff in a breast implant lawsuit to prove that the doctor knew about
the dangers of breast implants at the time the doctor sold them to the
plaintiff in order for the jury to consider these risks in determining
whether the product is defective. The plaintiff would only have to
prove that the defendant learned or should have learned of the risks
by the time of trial.' 9 Using this approach, plaintiffs would recover in
many cases in which the doctor under a negligence analysis would be
exonerated.
caused the product to be in the dangerous condition or that he was negligent in failing to dis-
cover it and do something about it." John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 VAND. L. RIEv. 551, 556 (1980) [hereinafter Design Defects]. Both Wade and
Keeton have advocated this approach in order to alleviate the burden of proving a defendant's
knowledge at the time a product enters a consumer's hands, or at the time of trial. See John W.
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983) [hereinafter Effect in Product Liability); Page Keeton, Product Lia-
bility and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 33 (1973).
194. See Wade, Effect in Product Liability, supra note 192, at 751-52 (detailing problems in
determining defendant's knowledge when "the available knowledge about a product is not so
great at the time the product is marketed as at the time of trial").
195. 778 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala. 1991), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 999 F.2d
1430 (11th Cir. 1993).
196. Id. at 1545.
197. Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
198. See Design Defects, supra note 193, at 556; Keeton, supra note 193, at 33; Wade, supra
note 20, at 834-35. Some jurisdictions have adopted the Wade-Keeton approach in specific cases.
See, e.g., Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
199. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
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The imputed knowledge approach is subject to the criticism that it
too closely approaches absolute liability-especially in cases involving
defective warning claims, where the seller can usually provide a warn-
ing easily and cheaply if the seller knows of the danger. If courts ap-
plied this approach, however, injured cosmetic product consumers
would find recovering against doctors/sellers easier than in a simple
negligence action. While many jurisdictions pay lip service to the im-
puted knowledge approach, few have applied it to cases in which truly
unknowable risks existed. Instead, most courts have applied a risk/
utility analysis without imputing knowledge of later-discovered risks
'to the defendant. °° Although this analysis is in many respects similar
to a simple negligence analysis,20' liability is easier to establish under a
strict products liability version of risk/utility balancing.
Courts applying the risk/utility test in a strict products liability
cause of action assert that it differs from negligence because the strict
liability test focuses on the reasonable safety of the product rather
than the reasonableness of the seller's actions. 202 Although one may
question the significance of this distinction, other more substantial
differences also exist. Jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs have in-
creased dramatically, both in terms of numbers and damage amounts,
since courts introduced strict products liability. 03 This marked in-
crease indicates that strict liability has made a difference despite simi-
larities to a negligence risk/utility analysis.
This difference may in part be attributable to jury perceptions that
strict liability should allow recovery more readily than negligence, re-
gardless of the analytical tests jurors are instructed to use in determin-
ing whether liability exists. Thus, even if the risk/utility test used in
negligence claims does not balance substantially different factors than
200. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON II. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 612 (2d ed. 1992) (trend of both courts and commentators to reject imputing knowledge
of risks). Interestingly, the commentators now opposed to imputing knowledge of risks include
those credited with suggesting the approach-Deans Wade and Keeton. Both have repudiated the
approach that they initiated. See Effect in Product Liability, supra note 193, at 761; W. PAGE
KEETON ET At., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW Or TORTS 967-98 (8th ed. 1988).
201. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 3
U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 640 (1991).
202. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska 1979); Page Keeton,
The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L.
REV. 579, 592 (1980).
203. See Berger, supra note 139, at 292. Berger points out that "[wihereas the first milliorr
dollar verdict in a products liability case occurred in 1962 (a year after the adoption of Section
402A), ninety-four such verdicts were rendered in 1980." Id. Further, "[iln 1984, there were 86
million dollar awards, up 1200% from 1975." Id. at 292 n.32. "In that same time period, the
average size of a products liability jury verdict increased from $393,580 to $1,850,452, a 370070
increase. " Id.
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the risk/utility test used in strict liability claims, the very fact that the
jury is instructed that liability is "strict" under the latter analysis may
make it more likely to find that a design's risks outweigh its utility.
No persuasive rationale exists for excluding sellers of cosmetic
products from the harsher consequences that strict liability often al-
lows over negligence for other sellers. As discussed above, sellers-
including sellers of cosmetics-may spread risks with insurance
funded by higher prices to consumers.2 04 Courts need not have special
societal concerns over higher prices when the products at issue are cos-
metic rather than therapeutic.205 Even those skeptical of the arguments
favoring strict products liability would likely agree that if it is to be
applied it should be applied consistently.2 06 Consistency requires re-
moving any exemptions that might be applied to sellers of cosmetic
medical products solely because they are medical professionals.
B. Medical Professionals May Become the Only Parties Against
Whom Recovery is Available
Although presently most cosmetic product litigation focuses on the
liability of manufacturers, in many cases manufacturers are or may
become shielded from liability. Perhaps the area of greatest concern is
breast implant litigation. As noted above, breast implant lawsuits
against manufacturers have "mushroomed wildly. ' 20" Consumers
have filed thousands of lawsuits and the number is increasing stead-
ily.208 A large majority of the cases that have proceeded to trial have
204. See supra text accompanying notes 139-142.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
206. An increasing number of scholars have expressed reservations about the desirability of
strict products liability in some or all contexts. See, e.g., Malcolm Wheeler, The Need for Nar-
row Tort Reform: Abolishing Strict Products Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM: DEBAT-
ING THE IssuEs (Kenneth Chilton ed., 1990); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J.
LEGAL. STUD. 29 (1972); Powers, supra note 201, at 639-51.
I am in a bit of an ironic position arguing for an extension of strict products liability, in that I
share concerns expressed by some writers critical of applying the doctrine in its present form to
warning and, perhaps, design defect cases. However, although I am uncomfortable with the
approach courts have taken to strict products liability in some contexts, I believe that employing
the doctrine unevenly compounds the problems inherent in the doctrine. In other words, if
courts choose to call liability "strict" in warning and/or design cases, they should minimize the
confusion and uncertainty that has characterized strict products liability by applying the law as
consistently as possible.
207. Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
208. See Moffat, supra note 102, at Dl. Facing hundreds of lawsuits and threats of thou-
sands more, one breast implant manufacturer "has stopped borrowing in the short-term com-
mercial paper market because lenders are concerned about the firm's situation." Id. In Harris
County, Texas, where a plaintiff recently won a S25 million lawsuit, at least 1,000 breast implant
cases have been filed, "with hundreds more coming in each week." Richard Connelly, From
Flood to Deluge in Breast-Implant Cases: Houston's Hot in Latest Mass Tort Craze, TEX. LAW,
Jan. 11, 1993, at 1.
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resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff.2°9 Many of these judgments have
been for over $1 million, with the highest reaching $25 million. 10 De-
spite manufacturers' efforts to settle many of these claims, a real pos-
sibility exists that this flood of litigation will eventually force breast
implant manufacturers into bankruptcy, making them judgment-
proof to future claims.
The asbestos litigation which dominated the 1980s and early 1990s
provides a powerful analogy. 21' Experts estimate that over 200,000
claimants have brought lawsuits against asbestos manufacturers, with
claims based mainly on the failure to warn that the product may cause
lung disease.212 Asbestos manufacturers have paid approximately $12
billion in damages,213 and future costs could total as much as $100
billion. 14 The legal fees manufacturers have paid are also enor-
mous. 2 1' Although the industry was large and healthy prior to the on-
slaught of litigation, these judgments have completely overwhelmed
asbestos manufacturers. 21 6 Every manufacturer of asbestos has either
declared bankruptcy or is in danger of doing so.2 17 Consequently, in-
jured consumers are now able to recover nothing or only a portion of
the damages they suffered and will continue to suffer." 8
209. Frankel, supra note 79, at 82. The most significant judgment resulted in a record $25
million damage award. Gary Taylor, Breast Implant Suits Pouring In After $25 Million Verdict,
NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 3.
210. See Tracey Schroth, Breast Implants: Latest Toxic Tort; Plaintiffs' Bar Launches Ag-
gressive Drive for Clients, N.J. L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1. Pamela Jean Johnson, the most suc-
cessful plaintiff, originally sought $64.3 million, but was satisfied with her $25 million award.
Taylor, supra note 209, at 3.
211. The asbestos analogy was indeed played upon by attorneys seeking certification of a
federal class action for breast implant cases in Cincinnati. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 82.
212. Landmark Proposal Could Signal the Beginning of the End of Asbestos Litigation in
the United States, PR NEwswIRE, Jan. 15, 1993 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file) [hereinafter
Landmark Proposal]. Fifty to sixty additional asbestos lawsuits are filed every day. Id.
213. Keene Calls For Claims Relief Fund to Resolve Asbestos Crisis; Dept. of Labor Should
Manage Funds Contributed by Asbestos Defendants, PR NEwswIRE, Oct. 14, 1992, (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Currnt file) [hereinafter Claims Relief Fund].
214. Glenn Bailey, Drastic Changes Needed in Managing Asbestos Litigation, MICH. LAW-
YERS WEEKLY, June 15, 1992, at 12.
215. Legal fees account for nearly $9 billion of the $12 billion manufacturers have expended
in asbestos litigation thus far. Claims Relief Fund, supra note 212. See also The Asbestos Juag-
mire, N.J. L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 16; Landmark Proposal, supra note 212.
216. Seventeen asbestos manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy protection. Asbestos
Maker Foresees Relief in Congress, LIAEIL1TY WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993.
217. See The Asbestos Quagmire, supra note 214; Drastic Changes Needed in Managing As-
bestos Litigation, supra note 214; Claims Relief Fund, supra note 213.
218. Gail Appleson, Asbestos Victims Suffer Setback With Court Ruling, REUTER Bus.
REP., Dec. 7, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file). Plagued by bankruptcy, Mansville Corp.
and other asbestos manufacturers established victims' trust funds in order to compensate the
most seriously ill victims. Id. However, the Second Circuit recently revised its approval of the
Manville Corp. trust plan, sending the matter back to district court, which could result in even
further delays for victims. Id. See also Landmark Proposal, supra note 212.
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Similarly, the number of potential lawsuits- from breast implants is
staggering. More than two million women have purchased breast im-
plants, 219 and approximately fifty percent of these women have suf-
fered damages attributable to alleged defects in the implants.2 2 0 One
commentator has estimated that the litigation will likely continue for
at least another fifteen to twenty years
l
.
2 2
All but two of the manufacturers of silicone implants have aban-
doned the market.2 2 2 Experts estimate that Dow Corning Corporation,
the manufacturer which had the largest market share of breast im-
plant sales, may face tort liability of up to $2 billion.2 3 Since the cor-
poration's insurance may only cover $250 million in claims, a
potential uninsured exposure of $1.75 billion could remain. 224 While at
least one analyst believes Dow Corning could weather this financial
loss, 223 others believe the corporation will file for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection in the near future.
2 2 6
Dow Corning and other breast implant manufacturers have pro-
posed settling a large number of the lawsuits for approximately $4.75
billion.2 27 Under the terms of the proposed agreement Dow Corning
would pay a minimum of $1.24 billion, with its insurers covering part
of the payment. 228 However, as of the date this Article went to press,
the proposed settlement terms would address less than half (about
6,800) of the approximately 15,000 breast implant lawsuits filed
against manufacturers.2 29 Many plaintiffs attorneys whose clients'
cases are addressed by the proposed settlement have indicated they
219. Andrew Leigh, Breast Implants: Next Gold Mine for Trial Lawyers, INVESTOR's Bus.
DAILY, Jan. 10, 1992, at 8.
220. Berkman, supra note 10, at El.
221. Mike McKee, Bar Split Over Implant Ruling's Impact; Plaintiffs Counsel Say Restri-
tions Won't Affect Current Suits, THE RECORDER, Feb. 21, 1992, at I. At least one attorney
believes that the threat of future litigation will not drive breast implant manufacturers out of
business. Id. Rather, "they will be forced to make totally safe implants to satisfy the market of
women who want implants solely for larger breasts." Id.
222. In the spring of 1992, Dow Corning Corp. pulled out of the business after having about
30% market share. In the wake of Dow Corning Corp.'s departure, only Mentor Corp. and
McGhan Medical Corp. remained. Both are smaller manufacturers based in Santa Barbara, Cal.
Rebecca Perl, Dow Corning's Departure Leaves Only Two Smaller Implant Mawers, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Mar. 20, 1992, at A4.
223. Moffat, supra note 102, at D1.
224. Id.
225. An analyst with Prudential Securities Research has stated that Dow Corning may be
able to absorb up to a $3.6 billion pre-tax charge. Id.
226. Id.
227. See David R. Olmos, Dow Corning Expecting $1.24 Billion Implant Tab, L.A. TiMEs,
Jan. 15, 1994, at Dl.
228. Id.
229. See Olmos, supra note 99, at D2; Levin, supra note 102, at 39.
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will advise their clients to opt out of the settlement to obtain more
money in individual lawsuits.23 0 Thus, even if the settlement is ap-
proved, it will not necessarily prevent Dow Corning from collapsing.
Additionally, problems may arise in bringing the proposed settle-
ment to fruition. Three months after the proposed settlement was an-
nounced, United States District Court Judge Sam C. Pointer held that
Dow Chemical Co. and Corning Inc., the parent corporations of Dow
Corning, could not be held liable for any damages assessed against
their subsidiary.2 1' This decision removed two of the major parties ex-
pected to contribute to the settlement, and led one prominent attorney
to declare the settlement proposal "effectively dead." 232
If Dow Corning and/or other manufacturers of breast implants de-
clare bankruptcy, injured consumers may not be able to fully recover
their damages unless they are permitted to recover from the doctors
who sold these defective products. The strict products liability policy
objective of spreading risks throughout the consuming public rather
than subjecting an injured consumer to catastrophic loss would be
frustrated. If strict products liability is to be applied consistently,
professionals engaged in the sale of cosmetic silicone breast implants
should not be exempt simply because they are medical doctors.
V. WHAT IS "COSMETIC"?
Defective breast implants illustrate the problem of distinguishing
between cosmetic and noncosmetic medical products. Approximately
eighty percent of all breast implants are used solely to increase the size
of the purchaser's breasts.' Such an application is likely to be consid-
ered cosmetic under any definition. However, approximately twenty
percent of all implants are sold to women who have lost one or both
breasts following mastectomies.23 4 Given the physical deformity
caused by a mastectomy and the widely recognized psychological im-
pact of such an operation, one might certainly question whether im-
planting a silicone breast following a mastectomy should be
considered cosmetic as opposed to therapeutic.
230. See Dick Lehr, $4.75 Billion Accord Eyed on Breast Implants; Plaintiffs, Manufactur-
ers Agree on Compensation Fund, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1.
231. See Mary Hull, Ruling Tangles Breast-Implant Talks, TEXAS LAWYER, Dec. 13, 1993, at
8.
232. Id.
233. Castaneda & Puente, supra note 100.
234. Id. See also Betsy Pisik, Alternatives to Silicone; Mastectomy Patients Have Safe
Choices, Wash. Times, July 14, 1992, at E3.
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Webster's dictionary defines "cosmetic" as "relating to or making
for beauty . . correcting defects." '35 Under this definition all breast
implants are arguably cosmetic, regardless of whether they were pur-
chased in response to a mastectomy or merely to make breasts larger.
However, the use of breast implants following mastectomies restores
the body to its original appearance. This is distinguishable from add-
ing size to the breasts solely to improve the purchaser's original ap-
pearance. Arguing that greater societal utility is derived from the use
of implants following mastectomies than from their use merely to en-
large breasts would not likely engender much controversy.
Critics may assert that dividing medical products into those that are
necessary and those that are cosmetic is overly simplistic. Relatively
few medical products are so necessary that life could not be sustained
without them. For example, a patient might require a metal pin in her
hip to enable her to walk. She would survive without the product, but
the quality of her life would be significantly diminished. Medical
products lie on a spectrum of societal utility, ranging from those that
are absolutely necessary to sustain life, to those that serve no other
purpose than to enhance physical beauty.
Indeed, many products may provide both cosmetic and medical
benefits to the same user. In Hufft v. Horowit, 236 the plaintiff pur-
chased an allegedly defective penile prosthesis. 237 The penile implant
was an inflatable device designed to alliate a penile erectile dysfunc-
tion.2 38 The court noted that a purchaser could desire the implant "for
procreation, alleviation of an impotency problem or cosmetic pur-
poses." 23 9 Thus, although a penile implant may provide cosmetic ben-
efits, it also has noncosmetic utility.
Courts could determine where a medical product lies on the contin-
uum between life-sustaining and cosmetic purposes by utilizing either
a bright line approach or an ad hoc balancing test. One bright line
approach would be to ask whether the product is primarily cosmetic
under a dictionary sense of the word. Using this approach, if a prod-
uct's primary purpose or utility is to make consumers more physically
attractive, strict liability would apply regardless of tangential medical
benefits or the consumer's motivation for wishing to appear more at-
tractive. Thus, even in cases in which a consumer purchased a breast
implant following a mastectomy, strict liability would apply to the
235. WERSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 514 (1986).
236. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
237. id. at 378.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 383 n.9.
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medical professional who sold the product if it is defective. This
bright line approach would favor physical needs over psychological
needs. It would provide certainty and consistency, but could raise the
prices of implants even for women purchasing them after mastecto-
mies.
Another, perhaps more palatable, bright line test differentiates by
considering whether the product merely restored the recipient's physi-
cal condition (such as obtaining breast implants following mastecto-
mies), or whether the product enhanced the recipient's physical
condition (such as obtaining breast implants solely to enlarge the pur-
chaser's natural breasts). Courts may conclude that sales of products
purchased primarily to "restore" physical appearance should not sub-
ject doctors to strict liability, whereas sales of products intended sim-
ply to "improve" physical appearance should be considered cosmetic
and not exempt from strict liability.3
Alternatively, under an ad hoc approach, courts could ascertain the
benefits-either physical or psychological-of the medical products at
issue before deciding whether the importance of making this product
cheaply available outweighs the goal of risk spreading and the other
policy concerns which normally call for strict products liability. Under
this approach a court might apply strict liability in the eighty percent
of cases in which consumers purchase breast implants to increase the
size of their breasts, and a negligence standard in the other twenty
percent. In a case similar to Hufft, a court might analyze the particu-
lar plaintiff's motivation for purchasing the product prior to deciding
whether to apply strict liability to the medical professional/seller. If
the perceived cosmetic benefit is not a factor, or is merely an ancillary
factor in the plaintiff's decision to purchase the product, then a court
may decide that the therapeutic aspects of the product prevail and that
the medical professional should be exempt from strict products liabil-
ity.
Although this ad hoc approach offers the advantage of flexibility, it
would also create confusion and uncertainty between both plaintiffs
and defendants as to what standard would apply in each case.'1 How-
240. Utilizing this approach would raise questions over what constitutes "restoring" the
body as opposed to "improving" it. Although in the case of breast implants the issue is fairly
clear, with other products the issue is more difficult. Collagen implants provide an example.
Surgeons implant collagen into patients' faces to remove wrinkles. Is this procedure restoring the
body to its original condition, or is it improving the body's appearance?
241. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (adopting the comment k rule for
prescription drugs and expressly disapproving the case-by-case approach of Kearle v. Lederle
Laboratories, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)); Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
383 n.9 (declining to consider whether patient's motivation for penile implant was cosmetic).
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ever, of the cosmetic product lawsuits currently pending, a large ma-
jority relate to breast implants used by the eighty percent of
purchasers motivated solely by the desire to make their breasts
larger. 242 Regardless of whether a bright line approach or an ad hoc
approach is applied, courts would consider product sales made for
this purpose to be cosmetic. Thus, in the majority of cases currently
pending, the issue of determining what is cosmetic may be of more
academic than practical concern.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have established precedents for
deciding whether to use a bright line rule or an ad hoc approach in
applying strict liability to special classes of products. For example,
comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ex-
empts "unavoidably unsafe" products from strict liability.2 43 Courts
usually apply the comment's exemption to prescription drugs. 244 How-
ever, after years of debate, courts remain divided over whether to ap-
ply comment k's exemption to all prescription drugs, or only to those
prescription drugs which are determined on a case-by-case basis to be
essential to society's welfare.Y5
The analogy between classifying essential prescription drugs under
comment k and difficulties in defining "cosmetic" medical products is
striking. Exploring the analogy may offer clues as to how courts
might ultimately determine when to apply strict liability to medical
pro fessionals/sellers.
Courts justify exempting prescription drugs from strict liability un-
der comment k because prescription drugs provide great utility to soci-
ety.24 Not all prescription drugs, however, are of equal utility.
Indeed, consumers may use some prescription drugs primarily for cos-
metic purposes, while others may be necessary to sustain life. For ex-
ample, penicillin's societal utility greatly outweighs the utility of a
prescription acne medication. Thus, the issue arises whether comment
k's protection from strict liability should apply to all prescription
242. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
243. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1993).
244. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989) (drafters of com-
ment k considered and rejected extension of strict liability exemption to all prescription drugs);
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (extending protection of comment k to
all prescription drugs); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 306-08 (Idaho 1987) (declaring that
comment k applies only to drugs whose benefits clearly outweigh their risks). See generally Gre-
gory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-
Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 199 (1992).
245. George H. King, A Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not All Drugs Deserve
Comment k Immunization, Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412 (1988), 21 Az. ST. L.J. 809 (1989).
246. See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 480.
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drugs-even those which offer primarily cosmetic utility-or only to
those which have a strong medical utility.
Some courts addressing the comment k issue have opted to engage
in ad hoc balancing of the utility of the drug at issue to society in
determining whether to apply strict products liability. An often cited
example is Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,247 where the plaintiff con-
tracted polio as a result of taking an oral polio vaccine manufactured
by the defendant. Although the vaccine prevented polio for the vast
majority of users, it caused crippling or death in about one in four
million users. 48 The plaintiff's assertions of warning and design de-
fects in the vaccine focused on the failure to make the vaccine in a
form capable of being administered through an injection, which
would not carry the risk of causing polio as do oral doses.
While agreeing that comment k should protect prescription drug
manufacturers in some cases, the Kearl court expressed discomfort
with "the rather routine and mechanical fashion by which many ap-
pellate courts have concluded that certain products, particularly
drugs, are entitled to such special treatment. ' 249 The court thus con-
cluded that applying comment k's protection from strict liability to
prescription drugs and other products should be determined on a case-
by-case basis. The court created a three-factor test to determine
whether to apply comment k. 250 The test focused on the importance of
the product's benefit, the seriousness of the risk presented by the
product, and the societal interest in making the product available ver-
sus enhanced accountability imposed through strict liability. 25' Apply-
ing this test, the court held that comment k's negligence standard
would likely apply to an extremely important, relatively low-risk drug
such as the defendant's polio vaccine.2 2 However, the likely would
have applied strict liability to a drug with a cosmetic application, such
as acne medication.
Other courts have disagreed with Kearl and held that all prescrip-
tion drugs should merit comment k's negligence standard, regardless
of their relative utility and danger. A leading example is Brown v.
247. 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
248. Id. at 456.
249. Id. at 463.
250. The factors include: "(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer
an exceptionally important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the
then-existing risk posed by the product both was 'substantial' and 'unavoidable'; and (3)
whether the interest in availability (again measured as of the time of distribution) outweighs the
interest in promoting enhanced accountability through strict liability design defect review." Id.
at 464.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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Superior Court, 2 3 in which the California Supreme Court held that
although "there is some appeal in the basic premise of Kearl,' 25 4 limi-
ting comment k's applicability to prescription drugs to a case-by-case
analysis would create too much uncertainty for drug manufacturers,
and thus would limit the availability and affordability of drugs.
255
Further, the same drug might be held to a negligence standard by one
court and to a strict liability standard by another, since the balancing
advocated by Kearl depends on the facts of each case and on the par-
ticular judge's subjective view of the drug's importance.2 16 Finally,
even in the same case, the judge and the jury might come to conflict-
ing conclusions on whether Kearl's balancing test calls for strict liabil-
ity or negligence. 5 7
Courts adopting this Article's call to apply strict liability to medical
professionals engaged in sales of cosmetic medical products might dif-
fer, based on their preference for Kearl or Brown, on how they define
which products are cosmetic. Courts favoring the Kearl approach
might analyze the significance of a product's medical utility on a case-
by-case basis in determining whether it should be labelled cosmetic
and its seller subjected to strict liability. Courts favoring Brown might
shy away from labelling any medical products as cosmetic due to the
difficulties in balancing discussed above. Alternatively, courts might
adopt a bright line definition of cosmetic, such as the dictionary defi-
nition of any product relating to or making for beauty or correcting
defects.
VI. CONCLUSION
As breast implant and other cosmetic product litigation matures,
medical professionals who sell these cosmetics are likely to become an
increasingly attractive target for liability. Applying the strict products
liability approach that courts have applied to other sellers of products
would make recovery against medical professionals cheaper and easier
than reliance on negligence actions. 2 8 Although policy concerns have
properly persuaded courts to exempt medical professionals from strict
products liability when they are engaged in therapeutic medicine, the
253. 751 P.2d 470 (cal. 1988).
254. Id. at 481.
255. Id. at 481-82. See also Jackson, supra note 244, at 203; Vaccine Injury Compensation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986); American Med. Ass'n Proceedings of the
House of Delegates, 137th Annual Meeting 79 (1988).
256. Jackson, supra note 244, at 203.
257. Jackson, supra note 244, at 203.
258. See supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
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time has come to hold them accountable on an equal footing with
other sellers when their sales relate to beauty rather than to health.
